This report provides an overview of information, prior studies, and analyses relevant to the development of functional and operational requirements for electrochemical testing of batteries and energy storage devices carried
INTRODUCTION
Non-abuse electrochemical battery and energy storage device testing at Sandia National Laboratories has traditionally been carried out in Sandia Building 894. As battery and storage device manufacturing has evolved, so have the testing requirements in support of these devices.
Sandia has determined that Building 894 is no longer adequate to support some future testing. Subsequently, a new facility has been proposed for these operations. A performance-based design approach and/or alternate means and methods of design has been proposed for those portions or elements of the new building not specifically covered by the Model Building Codes (e.g., Test Bays, functional areas assigned for environmental chambers). Performance-based design develops building performance requirements based on known operational characteristics and subsequent design goals. 
Purpose
The purpose of this document is to consider the functional requirements and potential operational hazards of non-abuse testing of batteries and energy storage devices as part of the performancebased design and construction of Building 1012, planned for Technical Area II, west of Building 905, Sandia National Laboratories, KAFB, New Mexico.
Although aspects of this document address safety goals, stakeholder objectives, and design objectives, this document does not include every element traditionally found in a performancebased design. Rather, it seeks to focus designers on select elements of the Users' operational requirements that require performance-based design solutions to avoid or mitigate low probability-potentially high consequence fire hazard and overpressure events.
Scope
The scope of this document includes the characterization of battery and energy storage device test operations proposed for Building 1012, and development of safety goals, and stakeholder and design objectives. The Sandia's A-E Design Team will provide performance criteria with review by Sandia Fire Protection personnel, Stakeholders, Facilities Management, and Subject Matter Experts. Planning and design elements of interest to this review include but are not limited to the following:
 Siting and functional layout (avoidance of local and adjacent hazard areas/situations; and sensitive environmental resources).  Structural (Functional area design, equipment layout, future growth; material ratings/design).  Mechanical systems (e.g., airflow, exhaust systems, material ratings; avoidance or minimizing environmental releases).  Electrical systems, (i.e., fire detection and alarm; instrumentation and monitoring systems for life safety).  Plumbing (systems in support of fire suppression).
BATTERY AND ENERGY STORAGE DEVICE TEST OPERATIONS
Background. On October 26, 2012, Sandia Department 2546, Advanced Power Sources R&D, was performing authorized battery abuse testing in Test Bay 1105F of Sandia Building 905 located on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. During the testing of a 1.2 kWh lithium ion battery, thermal runaway, ignition and fire took place -all anticipated events. In this instance, the fire event was somewhat larger than anticipated and resulted in a chain of events that drove an environmental excursion in wastewater pH outside of the permitted limits for the building. During the investigation that followed this occurrence, much was learned about the battery and energy storage test operations carried out at Sandia. Discussions with Fire Protection Engineers, Architect-Engineers, Sandia User Organizations and Safety Basis Hazard Analysts focused on identifying design elements that would result in better building performance in support of these and similar operations. This document seeks to build upon the lessons learned and previously identified design opportunities.
Battery Test Operations Proposed for Building 1012
The battery test operations proposed for Building 1012 differ from those occurring at Building 905 in that no energy storage device is intentionally abused to failure. Operations proposed for Building 1012 fall into a category of non-abuse electrochemical testing conducted within manufacturer's specifications. For properly designed and constructed batteries and energy storage devices, testing of the nature proposed for Building 1012 should not represent hazards of the nature or frequency of those common to battery abuse testing. However, similar hazards to those experienced in battery abuse testing could be encountered with improperly designed or constructed batteries or energy storage devices submitted to Sandia for testing. The following provides a description of the types of batteries and energy storage devices currently evaluated by Sandia through electrochemical testing.
Battery and Energy Storage Device Test Types
Batteries and energy storage devices and ranges of energy levels that may be tested in Building 1012 include, but may not be limited to those provided in Table 1 . 
Anticipated Results under Normal Operations
Results under normal operation include battery degradation or discharge, and may include anticipated venting, typically of small amounts of hydrogen gas.
Possible Results under Off-Normal Operations
Off-normal event results may be the same as occur with intentional thermal or electrical abuse such as thermal runaway, ignition/fire, leakage of electrolyte, rapid out-gassing leading to overpressure (SNL, Dept. 2546 Advanced Power Sources R&D, June 2013).
Electrochemical Testing-Batteries and Energy Storage Devices
In electrochemical testing, the energy storage device is connected to a test channel or other apparatus to measure and/or control the device (e.g. a power supply, voltmeter or a galvanostatpotentiostat). The unit is monitored while controlling temperature, voltage, and/or current, as a function of time.
Testing maintains the battery within manufacturer specifications for normal operations. In addition to temperature, voltage, and current normal operations may include a variety of limit conditions, such as:
Amp hour throughput between discharge  Humidity, and/or other defined operational limits
Long-term monitoring also includes logging applied test conditions and device response time, temperature, voltage, and current. This is carried out using temperature chambers, bench-top, and/or floor configurations dependent upon the scale of the test.
Prior Analyses
Following the Battery Abuse Test Occurrence at Sandia Building 905 two types of analyses were carried out to 1) predict heat and overpressure from a thermal runaway, and 2) characterize a pressure event. Both assumed a 1.2 kWh lithium ion battery, specifically the largest battery expected to be tested in the near term in the 1105 Test Bays. The first analysis involved fire modeling to estimate whether the concrete wall construction of the 1105 Test Bays would be damaged by the predicted heat flux. The second analysis involved Fuel-Air Explosion Calculations to determine whether the peak pressure would exceed the Test Bay Blast door design were a pressure event to take place within the cell involving the fuel source carried within a 1.2 kWh battery (i.e., approximately one (1) Facility. The following provides a summary of each of these analyses.
Relationship of this Analysis to Design
Provides wall temperature of design event (1.2 kWh lithium ion battery fire) and points to survivability of concrete wall design for consideration during design.
Fire Modeling Summary
Prior modeling analyses were performed with the objective of determining whether the concrete walls of the Building 905, 1105B Area Battery Test Bays could withstand (i.e., survive) additional thermal assault from fire. Modeling simulations were performed using the Fire Dynamics Simulator ( Given that the power of the Li Battery is estimated to be 5.2 times lower, the heat release rate was anticipated to be below that of the 1.2 kWh battery considered in the modeling simulation and planned operations. Because of this, two heat release rates per unit area were explored to cover potential higher heat release rates, specifically, 2.5 MW/ m Each simulation specified a 180-second(s) duration fire known from prior testing to be indicative of actual test conditions (Note: Although diminished in intensity, the fire may continue well beyond the 180-seconds); the grid resolution was set at approximately two (2) inches. Representative wall temperatures at the surface of the concrete walls of the Test Bays and at a depth of 0.0254 m beyond the wall surface as a function of time were predicted for locations known to have been directly impacted by the 905 fire event. Model results indicated that the highest surface temperature predicted was 364 degrees C (≈687.2°F) at the surface, and 77 degrees C (≈170.6°F) at the 0.0254 m depth. This value was determined to not exceed temperatures that would result in a significant decrease in the compressive strength of reinforced concretes.
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Critical temperatures for the specimens heated, ranged from 900°F (≈482 C) to 1200°F (≈649 C), depending on the type of concrete. 
Relationship of this Analysis to Design
Provides baseline performance for Test Bay door design predicted to withstand a Fuel-Air Explosion Over-Pressure event consistent with a 1.2 KWh lithium ion battery; assumes one event in bay. 
Species Grams

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Where the model building codes define minimum requirements to safeguard building occupants during both natural phenomena design events (e.g., seismic, flood, wind) and anticipated operational events performance-based design seeks to create a specific set of unique requirements for each building based on assumptions driven by design goals (e.g., safety, stakeholder). These requirements routinely include conventional code requirements, yet are also consistent with operational requirements and events. Structural engineers employ design to size structural members for bridge support, and loads anticipated to occur from snow, wind, earthquake, or other phenomena given the location and purpose of a structure. For example, fire protection engineers design to ensure that possible fires in a designed compartment with anticipated amounts of combustibles do not proceed to flashover and spread to other areas of a structure, potentially exposing building occupants to fire, smoke, and heat and/or impeded safe egress.
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A fire protection focused performance-based approach is used to supplement conventional prescriptive design for Building 1012 due to the nature and hazards of the testing proposed to include the potential for fire, smoke, varied combustion products, and overpressure in the absence of any codes specific to the planned activities. The following provides the Goals and Objectives developed for the planned facility.
Safety-Design Goals
The Safety-Design Goals identified for Building 1012 include fire protection design values and other safety goals and values consistent with the intended use of the facility (e.g., economic, environmental, mission):
LIFE SAFETY
1. Building design shall provide for life safety of occupants, and maximize fire and explosive safety. 2. Floor-plans shall provide code compliant and intuitive emergency egress. 3. Access by emergency responders shall be considered as part of the design process. 4. Emergency detection, annunciation, and suppression shall be designed to minimize injuries and prevent and/or minimize loss of life. 5. Siting analyses shall include consideration of current assignment of any adjacent explosive quantity distance arc(s) and ensure that emergency vehicle access, traffic circulation, and general parking is designed for areas outside local (Bldg. 1012) or adjacent (e.g., Bldg. 905) operational hazards (QDs, emissions). 6. Design shall consider wind direction(s) associated with adjacent and/or local building exhaust, air intakes, and corresponding stack heights where applicable to avoid exposure of Building 1012 occupants to emissions from any operation, either local or adjacent.
PROPERTY PROTECTION

Damage to the structure from fire shall be minimized (protecting building contents) from potential local and/or adjacent building fire events.
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
1. Mission and operating capabilities shall be protected through consideration of the proximity of functional areas one to another (including storage), and equipment layout; work spaces shall be designed consistent with functional areas. 2. Structural, mechanical, electrical, and other design elements shall consider separation and/or opportunities to combine functional areas, and systems, where safely compatible. 3. The loss of operations and business-related revenue from fire and/or other accident events shall also be minimized through design that considers the proximity of functional areas to one another and the need for future growth.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
1. Impacts to the environment from fire combustion products and release of hazardous materials shall be avoided and/or limited. 2. Siting location and construction schedules shall be considered from the perspective of potential wildlife populations; all environmental regulations shall be considered early in the planning (e.g., National Environmental Policy Act) and design process.
Stakeholder-Design Objectives
Stake-holder-Design Objectives are identified as follows:
 Avoid adjacent hazards and environmental concerns when siting the facility  Avoid and/or limit fire injuries beyond the room of fire origin, including smoke, and combustibles.

Egress should be facilitated through layout of functional/operational areas, including proximity of storage to operating areas (e.g., tailor storage areas to planned material) and equipment layout. Test Bay(s) structural design and material ratings shall survive the design event fire with no reduction in fire resistance or loss of structural integrity.
Consider equipment layout when designing to limit fire, smoke, and water damage from fire events in areas of high cost equipment and other capital assets (i.e., minimize damage to critical equipment through functional layout).
Operational down-time from off-normal events shall be minimized through consideration of proximity of functional areas one-to-the-other and equipment layout (i.e., consider power points, and other utilities required by equipment).
Future expansion should be considered wherever possible in terms of proximity fire walls, separation wall materials and ratings, electrical receptacles/boxes and maintenance access.
Safety Goals and Stakeholder Objectives
The following provides the Safety Goals and their relationship to Stakeholder Objectives. Damage to the structure from fire shall be minimized (protecting building contents) from potential local and adjacent building fire events  Test Bay(s) structural design and material ratings shall survive the design event fire with no reduction in fire resistance or loss of structural integrity  Areas that include high-cost equipment should be segregated from areas of moderate-to higher potential fire events where possible -minimize damage to critical equipment through functional layout
Continuity of Operations
1.
Mission and operating capabilities shall be protected through consideration of proximity of functional areas one-to-the-another  Operational down-time from off-normal events shall be minimized through consideration of proximity of functional areas one-to-another and equipment layout (i.e., consider power points, and other utilities required by equipment)
2.
The loss of operations and business-related revenue from fire and other accident events shall be minimized through design that considers the proximity of functional areas one-to-the-other and the need for future growth  Areas that include high-cost equipment should be segregated from areas of moderate-to higher potential fire events where possible -minimize damage to critical equipment through functional layout  Future expansion should be considered wherever possible in terms of proximity fire walls, separation wall materials and ratings, electrical receptacles/boxes, and maintenance access Siting location and construction schedules shall be considered from the perspective of potential wildlife populations; all environmental regulations shall be considered early-on in the planning and design process  Avoid adjacent hazards and environmental considerations when siting facility
Design Objectives
The following provides a matrix that identifies Design Objectives within the context of corresponding Safety Goals and Stakeholder Objectives. The Design Team will utilize this matrix to develop Performance Criteria for the project. Mission and operating capabilities shall be protected through consideration of proximity of functional areas one-to-the-other  Maximum operational down-time from off-normal events should be minimized through consideration of proximity of functional areas one-toanother and prevention of flashover  Ensure fire control areas are consistent with functional areas wherever possible to limit spread of fire from one functional area to another 2.
The loss of operations and business-related revenue from fire and other accident events shall be minimized through design that considers the proximity of functional areas one to another and future growth  Areas that include high-cost equipment should be segregated from areas of moderate-to higher potential fire events where possible -minimize damage to critical equipment through functional layout  Future expansion should be considered wherever possible in terms of proximity fire walls, separation wall materials and ratings, electrical receptacles/boxes and maintenance access  See Property Protection -Consider equipment layout when designing to limit fire, smoke, and water damage from fire events in areas of high cost equipment and other capital assets  Consider design opportunities that would allow for cost-effective future expansion such as increased rating to side or rear wall of building in specific functional areas (e.g., storage) 
